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The outcome of the German elections: what implications for Europe?


Illustration: Anna Ziegler; Source: The Economist
Illustration: Anna Ziegler; Source: The Economist

Context

On 23rd February 2025, federal elections were held in Germany to elect the 630 members of the 21st Bundestag. These elections took place seven months ahead of schedule due to the 2024 collapse of the incumbent governing coalition. Following the loss of its majority, the government led by Olaf Scholz called and intentionally lost a motion of confidence, which enabled the approval of a new election by the president. The 2025 election was the fourth early election in post-war German history, and the first since 2005.


The historical results

As expected and anticipated by pre-electoral polls, Friedrich Merz’s opposition Christian Democrats (CDU) won the elections in tandem with their Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU). Although this result (28.5% of the votes) was well below the 41.5% they had achieved in 2013 and marked their second worst result since 1949, it positioned them to lead the new government. However, the entire political world was vivaciously waiting for the results of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), which gained 20.8% shares of votes (twice their share in 2021) and achieved its best result in nation-wide German elections. On the one hand instead, the socialist Left party, polling well under 5% until January 2025, massively improved within a few weeks to 9%. On the other hand, the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), a populist splinter from the Left, fell in the polls, and at 4.98% narrowly failed to enter the Bundestag.


Unsurprisingly, the three parties of the formerly governing "traffic light coalition" all lost support. Notably, the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SPD) lost over nine percentage points and dropped to third rank with just 16.4%, their worst result since 1887. Their remaining junior partner, The Greens, also declined from 15% to 12%, still their second best ever result. The Free Democratic Party (FDP), whose departure from the government precipitated the election, recorded their worst historical result with 4.3%, and lost all representation in the Bundestag. The South Schleswig Voters' Association (SSW), which as a minority party is exempt from the 5% threshold, retained their single seat.



Some interesting takeaways


  1. A stark political divide

Looking at the map below of the 2025 German federal election results, one could almost feel transported back to the Cold War era.

Figure 3: Geographic division of parties’ vote share in the 2025 German Federal Elections. Source: BBC
Figure 3: Geographic division of parties’ vote share in the 2025 German Federal Elections. Source: BBC

The electoral landscape shows a striking divide that mirrors the former East-West split: the eastern regions are awash in AfD’s light blue, dominating most constituencies with a few exceptions such as Berlin and parts of Leipzig. Meanwhile, western Germany – especially Bavaria – is largely black, signaling overwhelming support for the conservative CDU/CSU bloc.


This East-West contrast reveals not just historical continuities, but also emerging political dynamics. AfD’s influence is no longer confined to the East – it is making inroads in the West too, reflecting a broader erosion of voter loyalty to traditional mainstream parties. According to recent data, one in five Germans now sees AfD as a normalized political option.


  1. Where the young vote goes

As the data below shows, younger voters in Germany are gravitating toward political extremes – with notable support for both the Left and the AfD – while traditional parties like the SPD and CDU/CSU gain traction as voters get older.


Zooming in, The Left emerges as the top choice among voters aged 18-24, securing 25% of the vote share within that group as you can see from the left horizontal bar chart. Meanwhile, the AfD draws its strongest support from the 35-44 age bracket, where it tops at 26%. Gender differences are also pronounced, as highlighted in the right horizontal bar chart: young women overwhelmingly back The Left (34%), whereas young men in the same age group lean toward the AfD (25%).


These generational and gender divides highlight a key trend in modern politics: new social media platforms are reshaping how political messages spread – and who they reach. With younger voters often turning to alternative sources of information and commentary, these digital spaces have become powerful tools for political influence. But they also raise concerns: as the case of Elon Musk’s visible support for AfD on X (formerly Twitter) shows, a single voice with enough reach can now help legitimize fringe parties and shift political norms.



The implications for Europe

Germany is often described as the engine of Europe. Accounting for a quarter of the EU’s total output, its economic and political stability have long been pillars of European cohesion. But that engine has been sputtering. After two consecutive years of recession, Germany risks entering a third. Amid rising anxiety over irregular migration and economic insecurity, support for the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) has surged from previous years, fragmenting even more the political landscape and paralysing both national governance and European action.


The federal election held this February has been probably the most consequential in years. With 82.5% voter turnout, the highest since reunification, it reflects just how much is at stake not just for Germany, but for Europe as a whole.

At the centre of this political shift stands Friedrich Merz, the 69-year-old leader of the centre-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Despite his long presence in German politics, Merz remains something of an enigma. He has never held a ministerial post and has limited experience in executive leadership. His business background is advisory rather than operational. As he prepares to lead, a critical question emerges: how will he rebuild a weakened Germany and steer Europe forward – especially as Emmanuel Macron’s influence in France wanes?


In interviews, Merz presents himself as confident, pragmatic, and calm under pressure. His economic worldview is rooted in free markets, transatlanticism, and European integration. He openly admits that Germany’s business model – reliant on exports to China, cheap gas from Russia, and American security guarantees – “is gone.” His promise to re-anchor Germany at the heart of Europe is welcomed by many. He also recognizes that resolving the migration issue is crucial to undermining the appeal of the AfD. But concerns persist. Merz’s proposals often seem incremental when radical solutions may be required. Take, for instance, the EU-wide banking union: he supports its completion, which is vital for Europe to compete with the U.S. and China. Yet he simultaneously opposes the proposed takeover of Commerzbank by Italy’s UniCredit, calling it “hostile” – a contradiction that undermines the very essence of a single European market.

Another important challenge seemed to be the ‘debt brake’, a constitutional rule limiting budget deficits that has long illustrated Germany’s fiscal cautiousness, constraining investment in infrastructure, education, and defence. However, the Bundestag’s recent approval of a constitutional reform on March 21, 2025, to increase military spending marks a significant shift. While Merz has remained vague on the broader implications, this development suggests growing political will to reinterpret fiscal rules; reforming or relaxing the debt brake could now serve as a catalyst for Germany to modernize its economy and strengthen European solidarity.


Similar uncertainties were around defence policy. After Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Germany finally met NATO’s 2% GDP target, thanks to a special fund established by Scholz. But that fund is temporary. Experts now argue that 3.5% of GDP is needed to counter new threats and comply with Mr.Trump’s requests. Without a recovered leadership from Germany, even the boldest NATO members – like Poland and the Baltic states – may find themselves isolated.



So far, Merz seems more focused on fixing Germany’s domestic problems first, before turning to those of the European Union. But governing will be far more difficult than campaigning. Germany’s leader must be ready to deliver sweeping reforms, both at home and across Europe. That means being clear, bold, and unafraid to challenge entrenched assumptions – whether on public spending, defence integration, or Europe’s economic future. If he hesitates, the price will be high – not only for Germany, but for a Europe in desperate need of leadership.


References

Grieshaber Kirsten. “Germany’s Scholz fires his finance minister as his coalition collapses”. AP News, 7 Nov. 2024, https://apnews.com/article/germany-scholz-government-struggling-economy-coalition-lindner-1cae2cd0266453103fc89800e47e7ce7

Connolly Kate. “Why has Germany’s government collapsed and what happens next?”. The Guardian, 7 Nov. 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/nov/07/why-germany-government-collapsed-what-happens-next

“Voter turnout at general elections in Germany from 1949 to 2025”. Statista, 3 Mar. 2025, https://www.statista.com/statistics/753732/german-elections-voter-turnout/

Official results of the 2021 and 2025 federal elections in Germany. Bundeswahlleiter – The Federal Returning Officer,   https://www.bundeswahlleiterin.de/en/bundestagswahlen/2021/ergebnisse/bund-99.html, https://www.bundeswahlleiterin.de/en/bundestagswahlen/2025/ergebnisse/bund-99.html

“Voting intentions for the German parliament from October 1, 2021 to March 7, 2025”. Statista, 10 Mar. 2025, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1257178/voting-intention-in-germany/

Chassany Anne-Sylvaine, Stabe Martin and Vincent Jonathan. “Five takeaways from Germany’s historic election – in charts”. Financial Times, 24 Feb. 2025, https://www.ft.com/content/4bc5438f-2deb-4026-aa99-746a7d3f9284

Nicholls Catherine, Tanno Sophie and Brennan Eve. “Musk urges Germans to vote for AfD in latest involvement in European politics”. CNN, 9 Jan. 2025, https://edition.cnn.com/2025/01/09/world/musk-livestream-afd-weidel-germany-intl/index.html

“Germany’s ‘business model’ is gone”, warns Friedrich Merz”. The Economist, 10 Feb. 2025, https://www.economist.com/europe/2025/02/10/germanys-business-model-is-gone-warns-friedrich-merz

“Can Friedrich Merz save Germany – and Europe?”. The Economist, 13 Feb. 2025, https://www.economist.com/leaders/2025/02/13/can-friedrich-merz-save-germany-and-europe

GDP - Countries - Europe | List. Trading Economics, Dec. 2023, https://tradingeconomics.com/country-list/gdp?continent=europe

“Orcel faces fresh opposition from Merz in chase for Commerzbank”. Bloomberg, 13 Feb. 2025, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-02-14/orcel-faces-fresh-opposition-from-merz-in-chase-for-commerzbank

Sigl-Gloeckner Philippa. “Germany Has Traded Austerity for a Mess”. Foreign Policy, 21 Mar. 2025, https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/03/21/germany-debt-brake-austerity-rules-confusion/

Mchugh David. “Germany to ease government debt limits in major step aimed at boosting economy, defense spending”. AP News, 5 Mar. 2025, https://apnews.com/article/germany-ukraine-debt-brake-economy-military-spending-74be8e96d8515ddddd53a99a69957651

“Bundestag approves special fund”. Bundesregierung - The Federal Government, https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/federal-government/special-fund-federal-armed-forces-2047910

Connolly Kate. “Olaf Scholz attacks rival’s ‘unforgivable mistake’ as AfD backs migration plan”. The Guardian, 29 Jan. 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jan/29/german-immigration-motion-passes-breaking-taboo-on-cooperation-with-afd










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