To Be, or Not To Be in the EU: Moldova’s Existential Question

“We are surrounded by the European Union, but we won’t surrender”. This is an aphorism by Serbian satirist and journalist Dragutin Minic Karlo, however it would be easy to imagine any pro-Russian Moldovan politician uttering this phrase right now, on the dawn of the second round of the presidential elections (3rd of November).

On the 20th of October Moldova held both presidential elections as well as a referendum on whether Moldova’s constitution should be modified to facilitate the country’s accession to the EU. The exact translation of the question which has been asked is: "Are you for the accession of the Republic of Moldova to the European Union?". Maia Sandu, the current president, and the main pro-EU Moldovan politician received 42% of the votes in the first round of the presidential elections and the “yes” camp won the referendum, with a knife-edge majority of 50,46%. 

This referendum took place in the context of the EU having opened accession negotiations with Moldova in the June of this year. Support for the accession has never been stronger in Moldova, as historically the country has attempted to “stay neutral” for both economic as well as security reasons. Yet both these reasons now seem to steer the country in a new direction.

Since Moldova’s independence, exports towards EU countries have steadily increased, overtaking the value of exports towards the Russian Federation and other CIS countries (the Commonwealth of Independent States is an intergovernmental organization similar to the EU but with ex-Soviet states), even though it is a part of CIS. Indeed, the EU is now Moldova’s biggest trading partner, thus it makes sense why Moldova would look towards strengthening its ties with the EU further, even more so now that Russia has imposed a ban on Moldovan fruits and vegetables in December 2023.

While the economic reasons might be obvious, the security concerns are more subtle. Back in August 1991, after Moldova proclaimed its independence from the USSR, tensions between Chisinau and Transnistria’s proclaimed capital, Tiraspol, increased. These tensions, characterized by clashes between authorities from Chisinau and separatist forces in Transnistria culminated in an outright war. The war started in March 1992 with separatists occupying a police station in Dubasari and taking hostages. Russia sent in its own forces in support of Transnistria in May of the same year. After many battles, the Moldovan president Mircea Snegur and Russian president at the time, Boris Eltin, signed a Ceasefire agreement in July 1992. Now the situation remains a frozen conflict to this day. OSCE along with Russia and Ukraine have been appointed as mediators with the stated goal of increased collaboration between Chisinau and Tiraspol, and the reintegration of Transnistria with a special status in Moldova. However, more than 30 years later “peacekeeping” Russian forces are still stationed in Transnistria, Chisinau has no control over the region. 

For this reason, Moldova has enshrined a neutrality clause in its Constitution in 1994. While this prevents it from joining NATO, it should not technically stop it from joining the EU. Yet, many Moldovan citizens consider that such a step would be equivalent to giving up on neutrality and taking the risk of a “defrosting” of the conflict in Transnistria. This is in part why; the majority opinion was not until recently in favor of joining the EU.  Moldova’s previous president, the pro-Russian Igor Dodon has made the statement, for which he was much ridiculed, that he wants Moldova to be “a small Switzerland”. And, as we know, Switzerland is not in the EU.

However, the invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022 along with increasingly aggressive rhetoric from Russian politicians towards Moldova and a potential reignition of the Transnistrian conflict,  has proven to Moldovans that neutrality will not guarantee safety. 

Two weeks ago, Moldova took two big, albeit wobbly, steps towards the EU, under the ever-open eye of Moscow.  A few days before the elections took place, the authorities in Chisinau announced that they had uncovered plans to destabilize and potentially overthrow the Moldovan government. According to the police, the political party of the fugitive pro-Russian politician, Ilan Sor, has sent over 300 activists to be trained in Russia, Serbia and Bosnia by Wagner forces in order to destabilize Moldova. In addition to this the referendum was plagued by recorded instances of vote buying by Russian agents attempting to increase the percentage of “no” votes.

While we still need to wait a few hours for Moldovans to cement their choice for a future in the EU, it appears that the pro-Russians forces feel the ground shaking under them.